Scarcities of environmental services are no longer merely a remote hypothesis. Consequently, analysis of their inequalities between nations becomes of paramount importance for the achievement of sustainability in terms either of international policy, or of Universalist ethical principles of equity. This paper aims, on the one hand, at revising methodological aspects of the inequality measurement of certain environmental data and, on the other, at extending the scarce empirical evidence relating to the international distribution of Ecological Footprint (EF), by using a longer EF time series. Most of the techniques currently important in the literature are revised and then tested on EF data with interesting results. We look in depth at Lorenz dominance analyses and consider the underlying properties of different inequality indices. Those indices which fit best with environmental inequality measurements are CV 2 and GE(2) because of their neutrality property, however a trade-off may occur when subgroup decompositions are performed. A weighting factor decomposition method is proposed in order to isolate weighting factor changes in inequality growth rates. Finally, the only non-ambiguous way of decomposing inequality by source is the natural decomposition of CV 2 , which additionally allows the interpretation of marginal term contributions. Empirically, this paper contributes to the environmental inequality measurement of EF: this inequality has been quite stable and its change over time is due to per capita vector changes rather than population changes. Almost the entirety of the EF inequality is explainable by differences in the means between the countries of the World Bank group. This finding suggests that international environmental agreements should be attempted on a regional basis in an attempt to achieve greater consensus between the parties involved. Additionally, source decomposition warns of the dangers of confining CO 2 emissions reduction to crop-based energies because of the implications for basic needs satisfaction.
Introduction
Ecological distribution refers to the social, spatial and temporal asymmetries or inequalities in the human use of environmental resources and services (whether trades or not). A typical example is the depletion of natural resources (Martinez-Alier and O'Connor, 1999) . This paper deals with the empirical measurement of ecological distribution.
The aggravation of ecological crisis 1 brings distributional issues to the top of the agenda (Luks and Stewen, 1999) . Since the scarcity of natural resources is now tangible, business-as-usual scenarios are feasible neither in a physical, nor in a social, sense. Standard economics has attempted to solve current distributional conflicts via growth, thus focussing on efficient allocation issues. Nevertheless, since ecological economics puts the scale goal on the table (Daly, 1992) , fair ecological distribution becomes, not only a necessary condition, but also an ethical issue, for the achievement of sustainability. The core concern of sustainable development is that of working toward guaranteeing the rights and interests of future generations. However, such an approach cannot ignore the deprived people of today while trying to prevent deprivation in the future -this would be outrageous (Anand and Sen, 2000) . Consequently, ceasing policies of unending growth to achieve sustainability will solve the distributional problem of future generations only at the expense of worsening the distributional problem within current generations (Aubauer, 2006; Daly and Farley, 2004) .
Since allocation of resources is determined neither by ethical nor by ecological criteria, but by the dominance of market mechanisms (Røpke, 2001) , distributional analysis of responsibilities for the depletion of ecological functions comes to the fore as an important tool for policy makers. Such responsibilities may not be equally distributed among countries, hence, neither are the commitments. The success of any international agreement depends highly on the perception of equitability by the parties (Duro and Padilla, 2006; Heil and Wodon, 2000; Padilla and Serrano, 2006) . Greater responsibilities should involve greater efforts toward global sustainability. From Rio 1992 to Durban 2011, passing through Kyoto 1995, distributional issues have unquestionably determined the international agreements reached. Consequently, an in-depth understanding of ecological inequalities may be critical in achieving greater consensus.
As a result, papers focussed on the distribution analysis of ecological variables are becoming of greater interest in ecological economics: it is noticeable that empirical applications have risen significantly in recent years 2 (Alcantara and Duro, 2004; Aldy, 2006; Criado and Grether, 2010; Dongjing et al. 2010; Duro and Padilla, 2006; Duro and Padilla, 2008; Duro et al., 2010; Duro and Padilla, 2011; Cantore, 2011; Ezcurra, 2007; Heil and Wodon, 1997; Heil and Wodon, 2000; List, 1999; Heil and Wodon, 1997; Miketa and Mulder, 2005; Nguyen Van, 2005; Padilla and Serrano, 2006; Steinberger et al., 2010; Strazicich and List, 2003; White, 2007; Wu and Xu, 2010) . Additionally, as consequence of this literature proliferation, a burgeoning methodology discussion is growing around the adaptation of well-known income inequality tools to environmental issues (Maguire and Sheriff, 2011; Duro, 2012a) . This paper's aim is thus twofold: firstly, we summarize and order the empirical application of inequality approaches to ecological economics. In so doing, we revise the methodologies applied and propose the use of decompositions which are usually applied in the main literature.
We consider the primary aspects which should be taken into account when these methodologies (already widely applied to income distributions) are applied to ecological issues; such translations are not always direct. Secondly, we analyse empirically the international inequality in Ecological Footprint (EF), showing both that it is a more comprehensive indicator than CO 2 emissions (on which analyses of this sort usually focus) and that there is less empirical evidence for its distribution (White 2007; Dongjing et al., 2010; Wu and Xu, 2010) . Additionally, EF is a reliable proxy for critical natural capital, which makes its distributional analysis of deep interest.
This empirical analysis consists of capturing, in the first place, the main trends in EF inequality over 47 years. Next, an additive decomposition is performed in order to distinguish between the underlying blocks of the observed inequality (Shorrocks, 1980 (Shorrocks, , 1984 . The main findings are that, although the observed inequality trend is quite stable and has a positive sign, the source decomposition analysis in contrast suggests diminishing inequalities in all EF components (carbon footprint, cropland, fishing ground, grazing land, forest, and built-up) -this may be caused by weighting issues. Meanwhile, subgroup decomposition shows that the bulk of the inequality (around 80%) is explained by the inequality between World Bank groups -this has strong policy implications in terms of commitments such as environmental taxation schemes.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the meaning and significance of Ecological
Footprint as an indicator of natural resource consumption. Section 3 revises the inequality approach methodology when the analysis is applied to environmental issues. Section 4 shows the empirical application of such methodologies by measuring EF inequality and its decompositions. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Ecological Footprint indicator
A commonplace in ecological economics is the incommensurability problem which deals with the fact that is only possible to compare in nature once there is a common denominator available 3 . The EF, introduced by (Rees, 1992) and developed by (M. Wackernagel and Rees, 1996) , proposes as common denominator a global bio-productive hectare, where each such hectare has the average biological productivity of the whole earth. So then, the question becomes how many global hectares a given population uses to maintain its consumption patterns; the answer is the Ecological Footprint.
The Ecological Footprint (EF) accounts for the biosphere regenerative capacity occupied by human activities via resource consumption (including household consumption as well as collective consumption such as schools, roads, fire brigades, etc.) and waste assimilation (see Ewing et al., 2010a, b; Kitzes and Wackernagel, 2009; Monfreda et al., 2004; Rees, 2000; Wackernagel and Rees, 1996; Wackernagel et al., 2004) 4 . Since both renewal and absorption depend on the health and integrity of ecosystems, regenerative capacity is a reliable proxy for the life-supporting capacity of natural capital .
Therefore, this indicator aims to measure the amount of "critical natural capital" (Ekins, 2003; Victor, 1991) as it accounts for one of the key aspects of natural capital: the Earth's ability to provide conditions conducive for life.
The EF framework has been widely used as an indicator of Sustainability as it is compared with a country's bio-capacity. This approach has given rise to a considerable debate, resulting in several criticisms of the measure (Fiala, 2008; Van den Bergh and Verbruggen, 1999) . Different (un)sustainability indicators are available, such as EF, Material Flow Accounts (MFA), human appropriation of Net Primary Production (HANPP), etc., each providing different critical information in an attempt to assess the complex concept of sustainability. Thus, sustainability assessment should accept its complexity and incommensurability and might best be carried out by multi-criteria decision making Martinez-Alier and Roca, 2001) .
Nonetheless, such debates are beyond the scope of this paper since EF is merely used in resource consumption measurement as a proxy for critical natural capital. Indeed, any aggregate indicator (for example, measures of aggregate economic output) will have both strengths and weaknesses, and this also applies to EF. But EF has benefited from academic scrutiny of its properties and limitations and this has encouraged its continuous improvement. Its strengths and weaknesses are now well known, allowing the interpretation of EF analyses in a transparent and unequivocal manner (Caviglia-Harris et al. 2009; Kitzes and Wackernagel, 2009; White, 2007) . Different methods of country-level EF assessment have been developed for many nations (Aubauer, 2011; Bicknell et al., 1998; Ferng, 2001; Monfreda et al., 2004; Van Vuuren and Smeets, 2000; Wackernagel and Rees, 1996; Wiedmann et al., 2006) . However the most widely used methodology for national footprint accounting is Global Footprint Network's standards (Global Footprint Network, 2010) , where the accounts are based on a variety of international and national data sources, including databases from the United Nation Food and Agricultural Organization, the United Nations Statistics division and the International Energy Agency (FAOSTAT, UN Comtrade, IEA). Different analyses have been performed using country-EF to test different hypotheses such as the Environmental Kuznets curve or the IPAT/STRIPAT model (Bagliani et al., 2008; Caviglia-Harris et al., 2009; Dietz et al., 2007; York et al., 2003) .
Additionally, EF has been adopted by a growing number of government authorities, agencies, and policy makers as a measure of ecological performance. Notable examples are those international applications such as the European Environment Agency (EEA, 2010) and the European Parliament and the European Commission (Best et al., 2008) , who consider EF to be a useful tool for measuring the environmental performance of the EU, or the United Nations Development Programme which considers that EF captures the environmental dimension of human development (UNDP, 2010).
EF accounts are made up of six types of land 5 : cropland, grazing land and fishing ground (to supply the food and clothes consumed), forest land (for timber and the fuel wood needed), energy land (accounting for the uptake of carbon emissions i.e. the carbon footprint) 6 , and finally, built-up land (accounting for land covered by human infrastructure).
where k = Cropland, grazing land, fishing ground, forest land, carbon land, built-up land.
The basic equation necessary to develop an intuitive understanding of how EF is calculated is:
Yield= Tonnes per year/Area -this may be rearranged as Area= Tonnes per year/Yield . More formally:
, where T i is the annual amount harvested or waste emitted for of product I; Y w is the world-average yield for the production of each product i, given by all the annual tonnes of product i produced globally, divided by all areas in the world on which this product is grown; EQF i is the equivalence factor for the production of each product i which is used to translate the actual land area into a world-average biologically productive area (Ewing et al., 2010b; Galli et al., 2007) . 5 For the underlying assumptions see (Ewing et al., 2010b) . 6 EF measures land appropriation by consumed products; some of them appropriate land directly (paper, food, housing, etc) , while the use of fossil energy included in all products (carbon footprint) is appropriated by a fictive and indirect use of land. The idea is to calculate how great an area would be needed to replace the use of fossils or to soak up their emissions. In fact, a sustainable economy would not drain natural capital, but continuously would produce the energy which is used (Røpke, 2001 ).
In order to obtain a consumption based indicator of EF, it is necessary to add the EF of imports (EF I ) and subtract the EF of exports (EF E ). In this way, we obtain the EF of consumption (EF C ): has the same EF -our focus is on analysing the inequality of resource consumption in a macropolitical way.
3. Inequality and the environment: some basic methodological aspects.
The development of distributional analysis methods in economics has been tackled in the context of Social Welfare Theory (Atkinson, 1970; Theil, 1979; F. Cowell, 1980 F. Cowell, , 2011 Shorrocks, 1980) . This focusses on the measurement of income inequality and its direct implication for social welfare. Therefore, the methodology applied to analyse environmental distribution issues may be borrowed from the income inequality literature. This inequality approach application to ecological economics has been applied increasingly in recent years.
Inequality measurement: partial ordering
At the root of inequality analysis, we will find that the key issue is the comparison between two states in order to decide which one is better off in terms of welfare. (Maguire and Sheriff, 2011) . Shorrocks (1983a) proved that, by multiplying the original Lorenz curve by its mean, some of those intersections could be solved, thus removing its ambiguity; this is the well-known Generalized Lorenz Curve (GLC) 9 . In the income literature, this implies that (holding inequality constant) the distribution with greater mean will necessary be GLC-dominant (better welfare).
Unfortunately, the GLC can also yield intersections even when the means are different. Figure 1 (right) illustrates a situation of non-GLC-dominance. Nevertheless, greater mean income is desirable, although greater EF mean is not, since that involves more environmental impact (scale goal). Hence, focussing on the low part of the distribution (first and second quintiles),
2007 exhibits a more desirable situation. In contrast, in the higher parts of the distribution the more desirable situation is that of the 1961 distribution. So, using GLC complements significantly the information contained in Lorenz Curves.
To summarize, which year exhibits a more desirable situation depends on which part of the distribution is considered more relevant -this necessarily involves value judgements (Atkinson, 1970; Cowell, 2011; Shorrocks and Foster, 1987) . Here, inequality indices show their true worth by ranking distributions unambiguously, based on the imposition of specific value judgements.
Indeed, one of this paper's aims is actually to argue that such unavoidable value judgements should be explicit and in line with the problem being analysed, rather than there being an arbitrary selection of index. 
Inequality measurement: Indices
The literature on the measurement of inequality has identified three basic properties which any inequality index should satisfy: scale independence, the population principle and the PigouDalton Principle of transfers 10 . Most of the more common inequality indices do satisfy such basic properties. Consequently, empirical analyses on ecological inequalities usually employ the inequality indices commonly used in the income literature; the Gini index (Heil and Wodon, 1997; Heil and Wodon, 2000; Wu and Xu, 2010; Steinberger et al., 2010) , the Theil family index (Alcantara and Duro, 2004; Duro and Padilla, 2006; Duro et al., 2010) or the Atkinson index (White, 2007; Hedenus and Azar, 2005) . In addition, it is also useful that the decomposability axiom be satisfied in order to disentangle the main contributions to the Total inequality (see Section 4). Authors take advantage of the properties of such indices in order to unambiguously analyse inequalities in environmental impact indicators.
Nonetheless, these indices were built axiomatically based on several assumptions which fit well for the measurement of income inequality, but which do not necessarily fit so well for ecological variables. In line with this, it is worth considering a remarkable property which usually is present in many inequality indices: the Diminishing Transfer Principle (Kolm, 1976) .
In the income framework, the society will value more "positively" a concrete increase of income for a poor individual than for a rich one 11 (i.e. inequality index will decrease more when there is a fixed transfer to a relatively poor individual than when the same transfer is made to a relatively richer person). This rationale does not make such sense when, for example, that 10 Three basic properties (Goerlich, 1998): scale-independence: the inequality measure remains unaltered by changes of the same proportion in all the observations. Population independence: the inequality index remains unchanged with replications of the population. Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers: any transfer from an observation (country) with a high level of a variable to an observation (country) at a lower level (which does not invert the relative rankings) should reduce the value of the inequality index. 11 The reason will be found in the concavity of the implicit Social Welfare Function transfer is in terms of pollution! Hence, the particular sensitivity of the different indices to the location where distributive changes take place must be taken into account when environmental outcomes are being analysed. A(ε)
Notes: p i is the population share of country i, y i is the per capita variable of interest, µ is the mean of the variable of interest and ε is the inequality aversion parameter.
Source: Present authors.
The Gini Index, though not explicitly defined, has more sensitivity to transfers occurring close to the distribution mode. GE indices (when β<2) have more sensitivity to the low part of the distribution. The inequality aversion parameter, ε, in Atkinson indices also weights the low parts of the distributions more (as long as ε>0) 12 . On the other hand, weighting the top of the distribution more is not really suited to environmental analysis. Therefore, as Duro (2012a) proposes, neutral measures (i.e. a fixed transfer is weighted identically independently of where it occurs) become more appealing choices when there is no obligation to favour any particular part of the distribution. These are GE(2) and its cardinal equivalents such as CV 2 13 .
Choosing neutral indices, however, is not free of empirical implications. Figure 2 As a result, the inequality trend in EF displays a quite stable pattern of global growth in the long term when we consider the whole period (from 1961 to 2007). Nonetheless, it is worth noting some particular episodes: during the first twenty years of the analysed period, there was a significant increase in the EF inequality. Once the 80s had passed, the inequality shows a tendency toward a slight decrease, this being more noticeable from 2003 onwards. The heavy industrialization of super-populated China in the last decades has had an equalizing effect on the 15 The coincidence in rates is due to cardinality equivalence.
EF distribution 16 , India has behaved similarly. However, apparent inequality stability can hide different underlying trends, as will be shown by decomposition techniques.
Weights and inequality changes
The scale impact of humankind on the environment, here measured by EF, is a function of both growing population and of growing per capita consumption. Sustainability is thus not only about accommodating more people, but also about accommodating "larger" people (Catton 1986 , Rees, 2000 . The analysis of EF inequality consists in measuring differences in per capita natural resource consumption weighted by (relative) populations.
Consider a world where there are only two countries, A and B. Country A is the only one responsible for environmental impact on the earth, country B having no environmental impact, since they live in a completely sustainable way. Subsequently, country A continues to have exactly the same environmental impact per capita with a lower relative population (either because of increasing population in country B or because of migration processes). Figure 3 shows that this two-country world has an increase in inequality due to weighting factors even with no change in the impact per capita vector. Similarly, an increase of relative population in country A would involve a reduction of inequality However, if the US population decreased until it represented the same share population share as Belgium, the per capita EF inequality would reduce in Lorenz terms 18 ; less accumulated population would entail less accumulated EF. We would like to stress in this section that such inequality reduction has occurred without any change in per capita consumption habits of either US or Belgium citizens (see Figure 4) . For the Lorenz-based indices we are using, the weight of each country is the relative population 19 . Despite the role such weights may play on inequality measurement, they have not received enough attention in empirical analyses (Duro 2012b ). An increase of EF inequality in the course of the whole period (as is actually the case), typically will be interpreted as a result of greater differences within the per capita EF vector. Nonetheless, such an increase in inequality may stem from changes in weighting vectors (i.e. the relative population vector).
Consequently, international inequalities on this basis may be attributable not only to changes in per capita environmental impact, but also to changes on the structure of relative weights 20 . In order to capture such a weighting factor role, the EF inequality change can be decomposed in the following way:
( 1) where p and EF are the relative population and per capita EF at time t and t+1, while I(.) is a Lorenz-consistent inequality index. The first term of the expression would reflect the change in inequality caused by changes in per capita EF vector, since relative population remains constant.
The second term would correspond to the role played by changes in the relative populations, given that the per capita EF vector remains constant. Accordingly, the inequality change can be decomposed by per capita EF share and population share. Table 2 shows the main results of such a decomposition made over different periods. In general, the main role in inequality change is played by changes in per capita EF vector. For instance, from 1961 to 1971 inequality grew by 58% according to neutral indices. This growth rate was 95% due to changes in per capita EF, while only 5% of it was due to weighting factor changes.
Nevertheless, according to the remaining indices whose sensitivities are to specific parts of the distribution, the role played by changes in weights was negative, -this means that such changes (located in low EF countries) contribute significantly to equalizing the distribution. In contrast, when a reduction of EF inequality is observed (see [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] , the changes in relative populations contribute to making the resulting distribution less equal, i.e. the per capita EF vector contributes highly to a more evenly spread distribution, whereas the weighting factor contributes marginally to a more unequal distribution.
Despite results suggesting that the main contributor to inequality changes is per capita EF, the weighting factor role must be taken into account since it makes its own contribution to the inequality trend, especially when the whole inequality change is of low magnitude (such as in short periods 21 ). In such scenarios, the weighting factor role can drive the bulk of inequality change (for example, 1991-2001). Consequently, the international inequality in per capita EF can be a consequence not only of changing (growing) per capita EF, but also of changing (growing) population. Nonetheless, the analysis indicates that the EF inequality trend observed is mainly attributable to the per capita EF vector rather than to the relative population vector. This means that the resulting EF inequality derives from differences in the "ecological size" of the average citizen in different countries, rather than from the world population structure.
Additive Decomposition analyses
Additive decomposition analysis turns to be a very useful in measuring and understanding the level, causes and development of observed inequalities -topics of considerable current interest.
Decomposing an index consists of determining which part of the total inequality observed is attributable to each of its components -such information may be critical for policy making.
However, a necessary condition for doing this is the satisfaction of an extra property:
decomposability (Bourguignon, 1979; Cowell, 2000; . This property implies that there should be a coherent relationship between the whole inequality observed and its constituent parts. Such a property additionally restricts the available inequality indices to a concrete family:
Generalized Entropy indices or some cardinally-equivalent transformation. There are two classic ways of additively decomposing the global inequality: subgroup decomposition and source decomposition 22 .
Subgroup decomposition
This consists in determining the contribution to the total inequality of each of the different mutually exclusive subgroups in the population. Here, the inequality can be expressed as the sum of the inequality between groups and the weighted inequality within those groups. The between component is the inequality which would exist if each member of the group had the average EF of that group. On the hand, the within component consists of the inequality which would be observed if the inequality between groups did not exist, so that the within inequality is the existing inequality in each group weighted by the population or pollution share. It takes the
, g=1,G, are the weights for each within inequality, p g and y g being the relative population and the relative EF, respectively. Translating that expression to GE indices, we obtain (Shorrocks, 1980 (Shorrocks, , 1984 :
where
. So, only for β =1 or β =0 (Theil indices) may the weights be read as population proportions (β =0) or EF proportions (β =1). The case for β ≠0, 1 leads to a problem of interpretation since the weights are a non-linear combination of population and pollution shares, and those weights do not add to one. Furthermore, given that the decomposition for β=1 corresponds to weighting observations by relative EF instead of by relative population, it is important to keep in mind that conceptually, the between inequality as defined above would involve transfers among observations, which could also lead to interpretation problems. For that 22 Despite existing different techniques being available in the literature, this paper will use the analytical decomposition approach (Bourguignon, 1979; F. A. Cowell, 1980; A. F. Shorrocks, 1980; A. F. Shorrocks, 1982) and the Shaply value decomposition (Sastre & Trannoy, 2002; A. F. Shorrocks, 1999) . Regression-based decomposition is becoming popular as a useful tool for decomposing the inequalityhowever it can decompose inequality by explanatory factors defined as is common in regressions, so that it requires more and different data and, hence, is beyond of the scope of this paper (see F. A. Cowell & Fiorio, 2009; Fields, 2003; Morduch & Sicular, 2002) . A wide-ranging review of inequality decompositions may be found in (Heshmati, 2004) reason, the Theil measure with β =0 is the most unambiguous solution (see Goerlich, 1998; Shorrocks, 1980) Subgroup decomposition has been performed using exogenous groups of countries such as those defined by the World Bank 23 . Table 3 illustrates this decomposition using three GE indices. The main result is that the bulk of the inequality during the analysed period is largely explained by the between inequality component (between 83%-88% according to GE (0)). Therefore, it could be said that the inequality in EF would be drastically reduced if differences among groups were eliminated, or equivalently, that if the inequality within groups were null, there would be no significant reduction in global inequality. Such an empirical finding has important policy implications in terms of achieving international agreements. In the light of these results, the probability of achieving broader and deeper consensus would increase if, instead of holding international meetings where all countries participate, the framework were in regional terms such as those defined by World Bank groups (assuming there are no other political issues on the table within these regions). This is because inequality within these groups is not so marked.
It is also worthwhile analysing the very evolution of these between (within) differences.
Looking in in more detail at the subgroup decomposition of GE(0) ( Table 3 , left), we see that the between-group component displays an inverted U-shape in the course of the period: in 1961
it accounted for 83% of the EF inequality. This between factor grows to 88% in 1972 and stays around 86-87% until the beginning of the 90s -it then shrinks to 81% of the overall inequality in 2007. On the other hand, also in Table 3 (middle and right), there are the same subgroup decompositions for both GE(1) and the neutral index GE(2). The Between component of GE (1) shows a similar tendency as that described for GE(0), although it exhibits some differences which may be explained, on the one hand, by a sensitivity to different parts of the distribution and, on the other, to different weights for countries. GE(1), as described above, corresponds to weight contributions by EF where GE(0) does this by population. In contrast, GE(2) cannot be interpreted in this manner, it is a neutral index. The Between component of GE (2) We have discussed the fact that GE(2) is the inequality index which, because of its neutrality property, is in best accord with this paper's aim. However, we have also shown that the best choice for decomposing such an inequality by subgroups is GE(0). Hence, we must be careful and consider the minutiae of each index when interpreting any results obtained by subgroup decomposition. Nevertheless, as far as our empirical results are concerned, the three subgroup decompositions performed by EF are quite close and, since they point to the same conclusion, this makes this conclusion quite robust.
The source decomposition
Source decomposition aims to quantify how much EF inequality can be attributed to different EF components -this may have deep policy implications for the achievement of equity.
However, the contribution of a component to the whole inequality can adopt different forms (see Shorrocks, 1982; 1988) . It can be stated that the contribution of component k to the overall inequality is three-fold, consisting of: the component's inequality, the component's share in whole EF, and the correlation between components.
It may be instructive to begin by considering the inequality of each EF component. Indeed, that may be regarded as a component's contribution to overall EF inequality 24 . Table 4 shows the GE(2) for each EF component. The Fishing, Forest, and Built footprints show stable trends, with a relatively high inequality for Fishing. On the other hand, the Cropland footprint exhibits a quite stable low inequality trend (a slight reduction); such a low inequality in the Cropland footprint could be indicative of the special status of some biomass consumption from cropland (food and fibre for human consumption), this being necessary for the most basic subsistence (Steinberger et al., 2010) . In contrast, the Grazing footprint inequality, despite also registering a reduction in the course of the period, always remains the most unequal distribution as compared to the remaining EF components. The explanation of such a high inequality may be found in the meat-intensive diets of industrialized countries (White, 2000) . Finally, the Carbon footprint inequality displays a significant reduction during the period -this is consistent with the findings In 1961, the most unequal distributions of footprint were for grazing, followed by carbon and then by fishing. However, by the end of 2007, the ranking shows grazing as still the being the most unequal, but now followed by fishing rather than carbon, which becomes the third most unequal distribution. Hence, the most unequal distributions, and thus the main contributors to EF inequality, according to this relatively simplistic interpretation, are diet-related issues followed by a decreasing energy-related issue. 24 It is a common practice in the empirical literature to use each component's inequality as a contribution to the overall inequality (see Shorrocks 1988 The component's inequality does not take into account the weight of each component in the EF, so, despite providing critical information, this approach does not distinguish the relative importance of having a high inequality in a component which accounts for 99% share of EF versus having a high inequality in the component which accounts for 1% share of EF. Hence, the second issue which must be considered in accounting for component's k contribution is its weight (importance) in the EF. Along these lines, any contribution to inequality consists of a weighted inequality index of each component.
By definition, EF can be broken down into the sum of its components, i.e.
where subindex k indicates each EF Component (cropland, grazing land, fishing ground, forest land, carbon land, built-up land) and subindex i indicates country. The idea behind the weighted source decomposition is thus to break down overall EF inequality into the part for which each EF component is responsible. Therefore, the source decomposition will have the form
where S k is the absolute contribution of component C k to the overall EF inequality which is a function of the component's inequality I(C k ) and its weight (or importance) λ k in the EF, µ k and µ being the k th component's mean and EF's mean respectively. If we normalize it by the inequality index, the relative contribution will be obtained, i.e.
Such a decomposition of an inequality index has several technical problems which will lead us to consider the role of correlations among components. We illustrate this by the most famous and widely used weighted decomposition, the natural decomposition of Gini index proposed by Fei et al. (1978) 26 .
Such decomposition is based on weighting pseudo-Gini indices 27 of the different components. If real Gini indices were used instead to measure a component's inequality, the equality in equation 5 would not hold any more unless the rankings of overall EF and its components happened to coincide, that is to say unless EF and its components were perfectly correlated.
This, of course, rarely happens, and so the decomposition would not be consistent 28 . Therefore, the problem with Gini decomposition by sources is the necessity of using pseudo-Ginis to make the source decomposition consistent 29 . However, such an approach makes the contribution of component k independent of its own distribution and dependent on the aggregate variable distribution (here EF). This is what a pseudo-Gini actually is. As a result, the source 26 White (2007) used this methodology in decomposing EF. 27 Also known as concentration indices: this is to rank the distribution of the different components according to the ranking performed by the aggregate factor. 28 Specifically, the sum of the weighted k factor inequalities would be greater than the inequality of the aggregate (see Goerlich, 1998 , Shorrocks 1982 , 1983 Cowell 2000) . This result happens because of the correlations among components 29 The procedure can also be extended to inequality measures other than the Gini coefficient (Shorrocks, 1983) .
decomposition turns out to be an uninteresting and trivial exercise. In fact, without further restriction on the decomposition rule, the results obtained are non-unique (Cowell, 2000) .
Depending on the functional form of the Gini index used, the contribution to the whole inequality turns out to be the component's share to EF λ k (Goerlich, 1998; Shorrocks, 1983) . This is why the literature does not consider Gini to be a decomposable index (see Bourguignon, 1979; Cowell 2000; Shorrocks, 1982; 1983b) .
As a result, the contribution of a component to an overall inequality is not only about its inequality and its weight, but also it is about the correlations among components, the last piece of the source contribution jigsaw. Nonetheless, such correlations are often neglected despite their significance in any empirical results obtained (Duro and Teixidó, 2012) .
The correlations involve interaction effects among components; for instance, cropland footprint may be correlated with carbon footprint. Accordingly, the inequality contribution of, say, a cropland footprint would be a combination of its weighted direct effects to the overall EFinequality and its weighted indirect effects through any other component to the overall inequality. Those indirect effects must be allocated to the different contributions (see Theil, 1979; Goerlich, 1998; Cowell, 2000 Cowell, , 2009 Shorrocks, 1982 Shorrocks, , 1983b Shorrocks, , 1999 . In the Gini source decomposition described above, the indirect effects are being assigned implicitly (by ordering components according to EF ranking) and arbitrarily (depending on the functional form of Gini 30 ). In contrast, the decomposition of the variance shows clearly what the interaction effects are and also allows an explicit allocation of them:
where the contribution of source k is a combination of a weighted factor's dispersion (first term) plus its weighted indirect effects (second term). Only when the EF components are uncorrelated, is the second term null (Shorrocks, 1982 , Goerlich 1998 . Consequently, the results on source contribution will depend on the researcher's decision in allocating those indirect effects, i.e. on the decomposition rule chosen. Following this line of thought, let us consider two simple ways of allocating indirect effects which will also leads us to interpret inequality contributions in different way (Shorrocks, 1982) :
a) The pure contribution of component k is that where all the indirect effects are removed from its contribution. Then, the contribution of component k will be equal to the inequality observed when all the remaining components are evenly distributed: Shorrocks (1983b) b) All the indirect effects of component k are allocated to its contribution. Now, the contribution of component k will be equal to the variation observed in global inequality when component k is evenly distributed:
These two methods yield different results because of different allocation of a component's indirect effects -this can be seen by using CV 2 as the inequality index:
In the absence of further information, it appears that a sensible rule is to apply both approaches equally. Consequently, each component's contribution will be a combination of its weighted direct effect to whole inequality, plus one half of its weighted indirect effects. In doing so, we obtain the "natural decomposition of CV 2 " proposed by Shorrocks (1982) : Shorrocks (1982) proves that, under some very plausible axioms 31 , the natural decomposition of CV 2 , is the only unambiguous decomposition method independent of the index used to measure the whole inequality 32 . Thus, if the researcher asserts that the best way to analyse the inequality in his specific topic is, for instance, A(0.5), there is nothing to which one may object. However, as far as source decomposition is concerned, the researcher must use the natural decomposition of CV 2 in order to avoid trivial factor contributions. This result is very opportune in environmental analyses, since CV 2 benefits from the neutrality property defined above.
Although the specialized literature has adopted this decomposition method as the most consistent one for the reasons explained, it is not free from criticism. The interpretation of the contribution of component k as its direct effect plus one half of the interaction terms for each k factor is not as intuitive as in most of cases (Shorrocks, 1999) . One possible solution is to use 31 The conditions are: a) the inequality index and the sources are continuous and symmetric. b) The contributions do not depend on the aggregation level. c) The contributions of the factors sum to the global inequality. d) The contribution of source k is zero if factor k is evenly distributed. e) With two only factors, where one of them is a permutation of the other, the contributions must be equal. 32 The variance also satisfies the Shorrocks axioms and the same result is obtained in applying the methods outlined above. Actually in the literature this decomposition rule is also known as the 'natural decomposition of the variance'. the Shapley value decomposition, which has its origins in game theory 33 (Shapley, 1953) 
The main advantages of using Shapley methods are that consistent and unambiguous decompositions can be performed using any inequality index, provided that the method is sensitive to the index chosen (in contrast to the Natural decomposition rule described). The major shortcoming, however, is that the contributions obtained are not independent from the level of disaggregation 36 . The resulting contribution is defined as the expected marginal contribution of the factor k when such an expectation is made over all possible sequences of factor k's inequality elimination.
An interesting theoretical result of the Shapley Value decomposition described is that it yields the same contributions as the Natural decomposition of CV 2 as long as this index is used to measure inequality 37 (Shorrocks 1999) . Hence, as far as CV 2 has been stated above as one of the most suitable indices to measure environmental inequalities because of its neutrality and 33 The Shapley value is an allocation method which assigns the gains of a player coalition among its members as a function of what they contribute to the coalition, taking into account all possible orders in which players join the coalition 34 The Shapley value decomposition also takes into account all existing factors in the estimation of the inequality contribution, it is symmetric and consistent, but in contrast to Shorrocks (1982) , the Shapley value decomposition is sensitive to the index used. For deeper details see (Araar, 2006; RodriguezHernadez, 2004; Sastre and Trannoy, 2002; Shorrocks, 1999) 35 Shapley Value Decomposition can also be performed by completely removing the source instead of equalizing it -this is the as Zero Shapley decomposition. However, such an approach assigns negative contributions to evenly distributed factors, which is against the conditions advocated by Shorrocks (1982) as reasonable properties of decomposition rule (see footnote 31). Moreover, Sastre and Trannoy (2002) propose avoiding the Zero Shapley decomposition because it is more volatile due to its higher sensitivity to the aggregation level. For further details see Shorrocks (1999) and Sastre and Trannoy (2002) . 36 Shapley Decomposition does not guarantee that the contributions assigned to the (sub)components of a given source sum up to the inequality contribution of that source. 37 If the variance is used, the Zero Shapley procedure (see footnote 35) also yields the natural decomposition of CV 2 . Any other index used will not yield that result (Shorrocks, 1999) decomposition properties, this result also allows interpreting the contributions in a marginal way 38 .
Thus Figure 5 (Table A4) shows the changes in contribution of EF components during the period, as estimated by the natural CV 2 decomposition. In the first place, the result (in Table A4) shows a clearly growing trend of Carbon footprint contribution to EF inequality, until this becomes the main contributor to the overall inequality. This result is consistent with White If we consider the long term trend (which has not yet been evidenced empirically) it is worth noting the significant growth of the Carbon footprint's contribution to the EF Inequality (from 18% to 69%). In contrast, the Cropland footprint which was originally the main contributor to inequality has reduced its contribution drastically (from 36% to 11%). Grazing and Fishing footprints also follow a shrinking inequality contribution trend (from 20% to 4% in the former and a smaller reduction in the latter, from 7% to 3%). 38 Empirical calculations have been made by two methods, the Shapley rule and the Natural rule and they coincide. Such calculations are available on request. 39 Araar (2006) discusses, among other issues, the decomposition of Gini index and gives a clue as to why its decomposition can be close to the Shorrocks solution; this is the low-ranking effect.
Note: The contributions can be read according to a Shorrocks (1982) or Shapley value decomposition. Source: Present Authors.
It is interesting to note that the contributions of a component to the overall EF inequality differ from that component's inequality indices as shown in Table 4 . It has been shown that all these inequalities decreased in the course of the period, however, some contributions, have not decreased in the same proportion, the Carbon Footprint contribution has even increased significantly. When the Carbon footprint exhibited the highest inequality (in 1961), its contribution according the Shorrocks rule was 17%, whereas it had become 69% by 2007 when its inequality reached the lowest level in the period. The reason must be sought in the Carbon footprint's share of the whole EF, which passed from representing 11% to representing 53% of the EF (see Table A1 in appendix). Similarly, high inequalities in the Grazing and Fishing footprints are compensated by representing a low share of the overall EF. The Cropland footprint, in contrast, exhibited low and reducing levels of inequality. However, its contribution to overall inequality has not reduced in the same proportion because, in spite of a reducing EF share (from 47% in 1961 to 21% in 2007) , it still is the second largest EF share. The reason for this is the strong link Cropland has with the basic needs of humanity.
These results point towards deep policy implications. In the first place, regarding international environment agreements, it could be claimed that policies aimed at reducing the carbon footprint (reduction in energy use) of countries will lead, not only to a more sustainable scale, but also to a more just distribution of EF (White 2007) , this may lead on to further international consensus. However, converting cropland to bio-fuel land in order to reduce CO 2 emissions will lead unavoidably to an increase in the Cropland footprint share and in its inequality, which may in turn have serious implications, not only for international agreements, but also for society in general, because of its link to basic human needs.
Conclusions
Empirical analyses on ecological asymmetries across countries have become an essential tool for policy makers in order to achieve a just sustainability. This paper has focussed on the analysis of international inequality in natural capital consumption, as measured by the Ecological Footprint framework. Our aim in doing so has been twofold: On the one hand, we revise the methodologies on inequality measurement when they are applied to environmental issues rather than to income. Inequality measurement on environmental issues has been commonly performed by directly borrowing techniques from the income distribution literature.
These are Gini indices, Atkinson's family indices, Theil measures, etc. Nonetheless, income is a 'good' while environmental impact is not (it is a 'bad'). As a result, this paper highlights some underlying properties in the traditional inequality measurement methods which might not fit in environmental inequality analyses. On the other hand, we extend the empirical evidence relating to the international distribution of Ecological Footprint (EF) by using a longer EF time series than in previous attempts. We have used a database from 1961 to 2007 for a representative sample of countries whereas the existent evidence was limited to a one year cross section (White 2007) , or to five years cross sections covering from 1996 to 2005 (Chen and Ma, 2010).
The result is the application and discussion of a wide range of inequality methods to a greater EF database.
As far as methodology is concerned, this paper shows that Lorenz dominance analyses are useful in particular parts of the distribution and that they should be accompanied with GLC dominance, otherwise the Lorenz curves could lead to uncertain statements. For instance, it has been shown that in 1961, the low EF countries enjoyed greater equality than those in 2007, nonetheless, the latter had less EF per capita. So in terms of sustainability, as far as low-EF countries are concerned, it is unclear whether one should prefer the distribution of 1961 to that of 2007. By considering toxic waste exposure instead of EF, we may clarify the underlying idea
here. Yet, neither Lorenz curves nor GLC allows a complete ranking of distributions because of curve intersections. Inequality indices are then indispensable for doing this in an unambiguous way.
We have critically reviewed some of the properties of inequality indices, taking into account an ecological economics framework. Although there exist different types of inequality indices, and several of them are widely used in ecological inequality measurement (such the Gini coefficient), we have demonstrated that some typical properties of those indices does not fit well when environmental issues, rather than income, are being analysed. For instance, Atkinson's and Theil's indices weights the low parts of the distribution more heavily because of their Diminishing Transfers Principle property. Gini coefficient instead weights the distribution mode more heavily. Neither of these behaviours is justified in environmental inequalities. In this sense, the neutrality character (all parts of distribution being treated equally) of GE (2) or CV 2 has been discussed as a desirable property to being satisfied (jointly with those basic properties).
As a result, neutral indices show a quite stable inequality trend in the course of the period in spite of a significant increase in the first decade and a significant reduction in the last years of the period.
Finally, we have dealt with inequality additive decomposition methodologies; by subgroup and by sources (EF components). The inequality subgroup decomposition has been performed using exogenous country groups (World Bank classification). GE(0) exhibits the best properties for this kind of decomposition, however it is a non-neutral index (it weights the bottom of the distribution more heavily). Hence, there is a trade-off between GE(2) neutrality properties and GE(0) decomposition properties. Such a trade-off must be considered when the results are being interpreted. Nonetheless, in the EF application there are no significant differences between the decompositions of both indices, which contributes to making the result obtained more robust:
subgroup decomposition by World Bank group of countries indicates that between group inequality explains almost the totality of international EF-inequality (83-87%). This result leads to two important conclusions: firstly, there is a heavy international division in natural resource consumption patterns defined by World Bank classification groups, indicating highly homogenous consumption patterns within those groups. This result is in line with Environmental Justice theory which points that certain subgroups historically have borne a disproportionate share of environmental burdens. In our case, this disproportion is in terms of natural capital consumption. Secondly, since the within inequality in per capita EF is so relatively low, reaching international environmental agreements (as far as they were based on EF) may be more fruitful for global environment protection if these were to be held on a regional basis (such as those defined by World Bank) instead of World agreements.
Regarding source decomposition, we have noted the inappropriateness of the widely used Gini coefficient decomposition since its resulting contributions are non-unique and the interaction effects are allocated in an implicit and arbitrary way. The only non-ambiguous way of decomposing inequality by sources is the natural decomposition of CV 2 , which allows, besides, interpreting contributions in marginal terms. The empirical results point out that, although all EF component inequality has reduced, the contribution to total EF inequality has not necessarily followed the same movement. This is due to changes in components proportions in total EF. For instance, Carbon Footprint's inequality has reduced; nevertheless, its contribution to inequality has increased because of its increasing share of the total EF. In contrast, Grazing and Fishing footprints (related to the diets of industrialized countries) exhibit relatively high levels of international inequality, however, they contribute modestly to overall EF inequality because of its low share of the total EF. The Cropland Footprint contribution to EF inequality has reduced significantly as a result of both having historically low inequality (basic subsistence highly depends on cropland consumption) and having decreased its EF share in the course of the period. This analysis provide important clues for international environmental policies: reducing per capita carbon footprint of countries will lead, not only to a more sustainable scale, but also to a fairer distribution of EF, enabling greater possibilities for international environmental agreements. Nevertheless, if that goal is implemented by converting typical cropland utilities in commercial energy (bio-fuels), this policy will necessarily impact on Cropland Footprint equality and probably its share of total EF will also increase. As a result, the subsistence function of cropland will be seriously threatened.
Environmental inequality measurement has been widely analysed in recent years because of its important implications in terms of universal ethics and environmental policy. Such literature, however, has focussed mainly on narrower environmental indicators such as CO 2 emissions and hardly at all on more multifaceted indicators such EF. Additionally, the methods applied to measure inequality are not always correctly adjusted to suit an ecological economics framework. Therefore, the results and discussions presented here may be of interest to researchers and policy makers concerned with a Fair Sustainability framework. 
